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It is a privilege for me to introduce to you this afternoon as our special 
lecturer a person for whom I have a great deal of respect and admiration. She 
is a person who has made outstanding contributions to our field. As you will 
see, she also has some remarkable personal qualities: she truly cares about 
patients and clients as well as those who serve them and those who advocate 
and volunteer on their behalf. 
With respect to her professional credentials, I could say about her that she 
has a Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of Connecticut, that she is a 
Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Maryland, and that she has 
accumulated in her professional career to date one of the most impressive 
catalogs of accomplishments to be found anywhere, and I will touch on just a 
few highlights of those accomplishments momentarily. 
But that sort of listing does not really tell you about our speaker. Dr. Leona 
Bachrach. 
To indicate to you something of the importance of her work, let me cite 
some of the subject areas—and this is not a complete list—in which Dr. 
Bachrach is a recognized authority: 
• the chronically mentally ill 
• deinstitutionalization 
• the homeless mentally ill 
• the young adult chronic patient 
• evaluation of mental hea th programs 
• continuity of care 
• model programs 
• the concept of least restrictive alternative 
• general hospital psychiatry 
• the reemergence of the concept of asylum for mental patients 
1 submit that it would not be possible today to have a serious or scholarly 
discussion about any of these vital issues without prominent mention of Dr. 
Bachrach's seminal publications in these fields. 
She is a teacher, lecturer, and writer of international stature. She has 
brought her extensvie background and knowledge to bear on the challenges 
and problems that we—as providers, advocates and consumers—face on a 
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daily basis, and, I might add, will continue to face throughout the eighties 
and beyond. 
Dr. Bachrach's ability to organize, to conceptualize, to identify the salient 
features of and outline solutions to these problems and challenges, and to 
share her insights with us via her eloquent prose has led to her being one of 
the most widely cited and quoted authors in the mental health field. 
I would add that Dr. Bachrach speaks her mind. There are no sacred cows 
for her. She has not hesitated to challenge some of the beliefs and 
assumptions that are widely held in the mental health field—when she feels 
such challenges are appropriate. 
Some of the most penetrating of her critical analyses have concerned use 
and misuse of language—popular buzzwords and use of vague and impre-
cise language—in short, the use of slogans and euphemisms in the mental 
health field. Thus, the focus of this afternoon's talk, where she will bring 
together her observations of and insights into this significant but seldom 
recognized or discussed aspect of MHMR care. 
Before turning her over to you, 1 want to mention just a few of the things 
she has done. As 1 said, she holds a Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of 
Connecticut. Currently, she is Research Professor of Psychiatry at the 
Maryland Psychiatric Research Center, a part of the University of Maryland 
School of Medicine, and Senior Consultant to the Maryland state mental 
health agency in the area of deinstitutionalization. 
In 1977 she joined the staff of the President's Commission on Mental 
Health and contributed significantly to two of the most important task panel 
reports which appeared in Volume I I of the Report of the President's Commission 
on Mental Health. 
Finally, in December 1982, Dr. Bachrach was elected to Honorary Fellow-
ship in the American Psychiatric Association—a distinction awarded to a 
very small group of non-psychiatrists—which gives you some indication of 
the esteem in which she is held in the mental health field. 
Gary E. Miller, M.D. 
Commissioner, Texas Department of 
Mental Health and Mental Retardation 
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INTRODUCTION 
The semantics of service delivery is a subject that's very close to my heart. 
For a number of years now I've been wrestling with thoughts about how 
words relate to the policy of deinstitutionalization—and how the policy of 
deinstitutionalization relates to words (Bachrach 1980a, 1980b, 1981, 1982, 
1983a, 1984a, 1984b). This topic is endlessly fascinating to me. I sometimes 
despair of it—but I never tire of it. And today I want to share some of my 
thoughts with you. 
But, of course, 1 don't think about deinstitutionalization all the time. 
Sometimes, in fact, when I have some free time, 1 like to read literary 
criticism. I have the fantasy that this gets me away from the things 1 usually 
deal with—like thinking about services for people who are severely disabled 
and all the frustration and sometimes despair that are implied in the pursuit. 
Then 1 find out that the two worlds—the one of literary criticism and the 
other of service planning—aren't really all that far apart, after all. A. Bartlett 
Giamatti (1984), the President of Yale University, has written a very well-
received analysis of Renaissance literature. He contends that Renaissance 
man had a deep respect for the "power of language." To the Renaissance 
man, says Giamatti, "words were units of energy," and, through their use, 
"man could assume forms and aspire to shapes and states otherwise beyond 
his reach." 
When you get right down to it, what Giamatti says about Renaissance men 
of letters is not all that far removed from what you run into when you think 
about the needs of—and try to plan services for—people who have severe 
and persistent mental disabilities. Here, too, words are immensely powerful 
devices. They determine the questions that we ask—and the questions that 
we fail to ask—in service planning and service evaluation. In this way, they 
very much control the dimensions of our service system. 
My presentation today is going to be all about some semantic habits that 
we've developed in our field. We use words to mollify, evade, inflame, and 
incite—and often we're not even aware of what we're doing. No only do we 
use words that lack consensus; we sometimes also use words indiscrimi-
nately. And these are the kinds of things I want to talk about. 
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In view of all this, 1 think that it's only fair for me to try to share with you at 
the outset one of my own verbal biases. And I'll start by confessing to you 
that—maybe as the result of my own history of physical illness—1 experience 
some uneasiness when the word "client" is substituted for the word 
"patient." John Talbott (1984), the current President of the American 
Psychiatric Association, has a similar reaction. Talbott writes about this in a 
recent issue of the Psychiatric News. He explains that to be a patient is also to 
gain access to certain benefits that aren't available to people who are regarded 
as clients. We can think of these benefits, if we want to, as entitlements— 
although I think that the term entitlement itself has distinct monetary 
connotations (Ehrenreich 1982), and I'm referring now to concerns that are 
really more qualitative in nature. 
Speaking from the perspective of the dedicated physician that he is, John 
Talbott takes a position that is reminiscent of an eloquent statement by the 
late Franz Ingelfinger (1980), who perceived, and wrote about, the world as 
both a terminally ill patient and a renowned physician. Ingelfinger wrote that 
people who are sick already have enough to deal with, without having to 
expend energy on seeking their own boundaries—and that the patient 
designation has implicit in it a certain amount of comfort. Only when he 
accepted his own patient identity, wrote Ingelfinger, was he able to mobilize 
his strengths and resume such ordinary life activities as teaching, lecturing, 
and writing. 
At the same time, I can readily understand why some people who work 
with the mentally retarded would prefer not to use the word patient. So I'll 
compromise and use both words, patient and client, today. I'll use the word 
patient to refer to people who are mentally ill and the word client to refer to 
people who are mentally retarded. And when I talk about both of these 
groups together, I'll refer to them as mentally disabled people. 
Furthermore, I'll be limiting my remarks today to those among the 
mentally disabled who are chronically so. Now, 1 know that the word 
"chronic" has pejorative connotations for some people, too (Word "Chronic" 
1981). But all I mean by it is that I'm going to be centering my remarks on 
people who have severe and persistent mental disorders that render them 
dependent on mental health or mental retardation services for a very long 
time—often for life (Goldman et al. 1981; Peele & Palmer 1980). 
Just one more kind of introductory comment: Throughout my comments 
this afternoon I'm going to be focusing on some key concepts and words— 
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words that are familiar to all of us who are involved with services for the 
mentally disabled today, words like "asylum" and "least restrictive alterna-
tive" and "young adult chronic patient." And I'll necessarily be saying quite a 
lot about something that's called "deinstitutionalization." 
At the end of this presentation I'll try to put my remarks in perspective by 
suggesting some reasons that semantics operates as it does in our field. And 
I'll talk about the need to clear up our concepts and our thinking if we're 
going to profit from past errors in service planning. 
I'd like to begin my discussion this afternoon by making a statement and 
then asking how many of you in the audience agree or disagree with it. 
This is the statement: 
The goal of deinstitutionalization is to provide, for mentally disabled 
people who do not require institutionalization, humane and sensitive care in 
the east restrictive community alternative. 
Does anybody here seriously disagree with this statement? If anybody 
does, let's try to go into the matter later, during the discussion period. But 1 
doubt that many people here this afternoon would take serious issue with 
that statement—because I think that it's a faithful and accurate description of 
what deinstitutionalization is supposed to do. 
But I need to point out something to you. That statement contains at least 
three terms that are very imprecise—"deinstitutionalization," "community," 
and "least restrictive alternative." Each of these terms means different things 
to different people. Yet, we in this room can agree with a "principle" that's 
implied in that statement—even though the principle is expressed in words 
that aren't at all clear. 
There are many different understandings of these three terms—deinstitu-
tionalization, community, and least restrictive alternative. In fact, maybe 
there are almost as many different understandings as there are people in this 
room. Yet, we've planned mental health and mental retardation services— 
and sometimes even entire service systems—based on the assumption that 
there's a shared understanding of these very vital words. 
Sometimes we've found that our vagueness has resulted in irrelevant— 
maybe even inhumane—programming. 
9 
SEMANTIC GAMES 
Which brings me to my major point: 
For reasons that are numerous and diverse—and certainly not entirely 
clear to me—people who plan services for, and deliver services to, the 
mentally disab ed play a lot of games with abstractions—semantic games. 
1 think that there are two major varieties of these games—number games 
and word games. And every once in a while the two are combined into one 
huge super game. 
Let me give you an example of what I'm talking about: 
Maybe you're aware that throughout the country there's been a problem of 
rapidly increasing populations of homeless people: people who have no place 
to live. It's fairly widely agreed now that a substantial portion of that 
population (the exact percentage varies among communities) consists of 
people who are chronically mentally ill (Bachrach 1984c). For several years, 
now, the federal Department of Health and Human Services has been 
estimating that there are about 2 million homeless people in the country and 
that about half of them—some one million—suffer from conditions that come 
broadly under the heading of alcohol, drug abuse, or mental health problems 
(Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration 1983). 
Now, what do you do if you're the federal government, and you've been 
saying that there are two million homeless people out there, and that about 
half of them are very sick and need some assistance? Well, you can either deal 
with a problem like this one substantively—by trying to do something to 
relieve the situation through allocating special funds or designing special 
programs. Or else, if you cannot or do not want to deal with it substantively, 
then you can deal with it through abstractions, i.e., by a semantic game. And 
if you the do latter well enough, maybe you won't have to deal with the 
substantive part at all! 
In this particular case of homeless citizens, the federal government has 
apparently chosen to deal with the problem of homelessness in a non-
substantive way by playing a decisive numbers game. After the estimate of 
two million homeless people had been floating around for a while, the United 
States Department of Housing and Urban Development (1984) came out with 
a much smaller estimate of 250,000 to 300,000 homeless people—thus cutting 
the original estimate by over 85 percent. 
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Never mind that a lot of very reliable scholars, organizations, and 
individuals have condemned the smaller estimate as being not only grossly 
inaccurate (Goode 1984; Guillermoprieto 1984; Harris 1984; McCarthy 1984a, 
1984b; Pear 1984), but, worse, a deliberate attempt to mislead (Hopper 1984; 
Kamen 1984). Never mind that there has been sufficient outrage that 
Congressional hearings—with damning evidence against the estimate—have 
been held. The smaller estimate sticks—because it effectively provides a way 
to get rid of an embarrassing problem that doesn't lend itse f to quick and 
inexpensive solutions. If you can get away with saying that the problem of 
homelessness isn't really very significant numerically, then maybe you can 
rationalize not dealing with it, and no one will fault you. 
Now, semanhc games vary among themselves in a number of ways. Some 
are much more subtle than others. At one extreme we have semantic games 
that are played quite deliberately. They are conscious efforts that have the 
express purpose of gaining a particular advantage. They make calculated use 
of catchwords or vastly oversimplified statements in order to gain some 
political or financial ground. 
The journalist Ward Sinclair (1982) describes a deliberate semantic game 
that involves migrant farmworkers—and we're all familiar with similar ploys 
in our own field. 1 give you this example from another field, because 
sometimes it's easier to understand these things from a distance. Sinclair 
writes that in some places migrant farmworkers are now being called 
"sharecroppers." And he describes this as a "linguistic nicety that allows the 
farmers who employ them to avoid paying minimum wages and to escape 
Social Security, unemployment, and workmen's compensation benefits." 
At the other extreme are semantic games that are so complicated and so 
subtle that they even fool the people who invent them. We rationalize a lot of 
what we do—and also a lot of what we don't do—by playing these subtle 
games (Edelman 1977; Fiske 1982; Newman 1975; Talbott 1975). They help us 
to evade, deny, displace, and obstruct. 
1 think that one of the most insidious semantic games that we play revolves 
around the denial that the mentally ill are in fact ill (Talbott 1984). Sometimes 
we go to considerable lengths to reinforce this notion (Szasz 1982), but that 
doesn't make the illness go away. 
12 
Several years ago the journalist Susan Sontag (1979) wrote about the 
dangers inherent in this kind of denial with respect to nonpsychiatric 
illnesses. In her classic book, Illness as Metaphor, Sontag focused on tuber-
culosis and cancer and talked about people's tendency to act as if these 
conditions would not occur if the patient, or society, had somehow behaved 
differently—perhaps followed a more healthful or more moral life style. 
The purpose of Sontag's small but brilliant volume is expressed in her 
prefatory statement, which I'd like to quote: "My subject is not physical 
illness itself but the uses of illness as a figure or metaphor. My point is that 
illness is not a metaphor, and that the most truthful way of regarding illness 
. . . is one most purified of, most resistant to, metaphoric thinking." 
1 believe that Sontag's point also applies in the case of chronic mental 
illnesses. It's often so hard for us to confront the reality of these illnesses that 
we want to deny their very existence. And, when we do this, we 
professionals aren't really too very different from the citizen in San Jose, 
California, who wrote to Ann Landers (1981): "We hear so much about 
mental illness these days. Why isn't there more emphasis on mental health?" 
What's wrong with evasion and denial? Well, the trouble with them is that, 
despite our good intentions, they hold the potential for ultimately penalizing 
mentally disabled people and for making their lives more burdensome. 
Using the example 1 just gave you, I'd say that it's easy to jump from 
denying the existence of illness to denying the need for special services in the 
case of people who are chronically mentally ill . And, in fact, this is exactly 
where some of our semantic games have gotten us. We've now apparently 
granted some public officials permission to insist that mentally ill people who 
are undomiciled are that way by choice (Williams 1984). Implicit in this is the 
notion that they are not really entitled to assistance. 
Some of the semantic games that we play in mental health and mental 
retardation are so powerful that—as 1 hinted earlier—they even deceive 
those among us who consider ourselves to be sophisticated professionals and 
who are thoroughly committed to the mentally disabled. 
For instance, we talk about "admission diversion" policies (Dionne 1978; 
Morrissey & McGreevy 1982; Pepper & Ryglewicz 1982; Shapiro 1983; 
Sullivan 1979a, 1979b), when, what we really mean is, "We don't have the 
resources or the will to take care of this patient or client in this place. And we 
hope that somebody else will get us out of being responsible for this patient 
or client, and take him or her off our hands." 
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Another example: 
We talk about a patient's or client's "continuity of care" (Bachrach 1981; 
Wasylenki & Goering 1984) when what we really mean is that we've written 
the name of a referral agency on his or her discharge summary. And we hope 
that the patient or client will initiate the contact for that referral and carry 
through—because we're not really set up ourselves to do that. 
And another: 
We talk about the "exceptional" child, when, what we're really talking 
about is an individual who. needs exceptional kinds and exceptional quan-
tities of care. And we overlook the fact that, when we use this euphemism 
with the object of combating stigma, we also run the risk of reducing the 
public's awareness of severe disability—and of the need for special resources. 
The anthropologist Nancy Scheper-Hughes (1983) very appropriately re-
minds us that substituting a euphemism for a technical term without 
addressing contextual concerns can ultimately act to a patient's or client's 
disadvantage. 
And another: 
We refer to the "revolving door" pejoratively (Geller 1982), as if it implies 
that our service initiatives—and, worse yet, our patients and clients—have 
somehow failed (Harris & Bergman 1984). Paradoxically, we allow that 
people who have other kinds of chronic disabilities may periodically need to 
)e admitted for inpatient care. But with the mentally disabled, we're uniquely 
insistent that patients and clients always have to move forward along some 
imaginary continuum of "progress." 
And one final example: 
We emphasize the importance of "aftercare" services for the mentally 
disabled in much of our programming. Aftercare services are supposed to 
facilitate the patient's or client's transition from institutional to community 
living. And we emphasize this aftercare, even though fewer and fewer 
mentally disabled individuals are now entering institutions in the first place. 
And those who do enter institutions today usually stay only a few days or a 
few weeks (Bachrach 1984b; Goldman et al. 1983)—hardly long enough for 
them to become products of institutional environments. What we don't seem 
to realize is that focusing on aftercare really serves a gatekeeping function. 
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It's a strategy that effectively keeps a number of people out of the service 
system. Because they've never been inpatients, they just don't qualify for 
aftercare. 
I could go on and on, but I'm sure you get the idea. The semanticist 
Hayakawa (1972) warns us that "fine-sounding speeches, long words, and 
the general air of saying something important are affective in result, 
regardless of what is being said." When we hear impressively worded 
statements, Hayakawa tells us, we may "stop being critical altogether." 
This is especially true in the case of words and statements that relate to 
certain kinds of policy decisions. It's very easy for us to accept words in place 
of deeds, when the words sound impressive and the deeds are hard to 
accomplish. 
In fact, semantic games seem to permeate all aspects of service delivery for 
mentally disabled people (Melito 1982; Talbott 1975; Wilder & Karasu 1977). 
On the conceptual level, we sometimes use terms that are so vague that they 
limit our ability to think clearly about the things we need to deal with. And, 
often, we are not even aware of the fact that some of these terms are 
imprecise or that they have multiple meanings. 
In addition, we often use catchwords, buzzwords, euphemisms, slogans, 
and metaphors to minimize the complexity of the problems we need to 
resolve. 
Let me give you an example of this from current events: 
We're all familiar with the federal government's wish to limit social 
program entitlements to people who are "truly needy." Well, apparently, the 
people who gave us the notion of the truly needy have tried, in this election 
year, to tighten up that slogan—and to change it to the "very truly needy." 
An editorial in the Washington Post raises these rhetorical but nonetheless 
thought-provoking questions about the proposed change. It asks, "What if 
someone who was only mildly hungry got free food?" And "what if only the 
somewhat homeless got a place to live?" (Truly Nutty 1984). 
Semantic games get in the way of proper program evaluation, too. They 
give us problems when we try to assess the outcomes of our interventions 
accurate y and dispassionately (Bachrach 1980b, 1982; Bachrach and Lamb 
1982). How in the world, for example, can you evaluate a community support 
program when there's no rigorous and operational definition of what a 
community support program is or what it's supposed to do (Bachrach 1982)? 
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I think that my favorite example of how semantic games interfere with 
evaluation, though, is in the general failure in much of our research to make a 
distinction between "readmission" and "relapse." We often conduct studies 
as if a person's hospitalization is evidence that he or she has had an 
exacerbation—and, conversely, as if a person's lack of hospitalization is 
evidence that he or she is doing well clinically. But, of course, people can be 
hospitalized—or not be hospitalized—for a lot of reasons that are entirely 
non-clinical (Franklin et al. 1975; Hausman 1982; Solomon & Doll 1979):— 
reasons like simply having no place else to go. It's a mistake to evaluate a 
patient's or client's status—or to assess a system's quality of care—on the 
basis of hospital utilization statistics. 
Sometimes our semantic games lead us to come up with some very good 
answers—but we lose sight of the questions. For example, we do this when 
we look at an isolated successful program for mentally disabled people and 
conclude from its existence that the entire deinstitutionalization movement is 
"working" (Bachrach 1980b). When we do this, we're engaging in something 
that semanticists call "metonymy." We're focusing on one aspect of an event, 
in order to make generalizations about the entire event. According to one 
semanticist, Edelman (1977), this kind of substitution of a part for the whole 
is really a subtle device for helping us to accept problematic situations by 
persuading ourselves that they've been resolved in a rational way. 
In this connection I'd like to mention briefly one really troublesome area 
that's been confounded by semantic games. I want to mention this only 
parenthetically, because 1 could easily get carried away and spend my entire 
time this afternoon talking to you about this particular aspect of semantics. It 
has to do with the tremendous problem that we have in describing residential 
facilities for the mentally disabled. 
We talk about residences for mentally disabled people as if places that 
share the same designation are uniform—as if they're all pretty much alike. 
So we say that a specific patient or client is now ready for a halfway house or 
that he or she real y belongs in a nursing home. We say these kinds of things 
as if there's a predictable uniformity in the places to which we give these 
names. 
But the truth is that halfway housei may be nothing like halfway housez; 
nursing homci isn't necessarily very much like nursing homea; state schooh is 
entirely different from state schoolz; and so forth (Bachrach 1980a). And, in 
fact, there's probably as much variation within classes of residential facilities 
as there is among them—if not more. 
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Now, originally, the concept of fhe least restrictive alternative was 
supposed to serve as an aid in planning appropriate and relevant services for 
mentally disabled people. But I would suggest to you that the concept of the 
least restrictive alternative is really too imprecise and too unrefined to serve 
us in that way. In order for a concept to be useful as a planning aid, it needs 
to be precisely defined, and its empirical referents need to be very clearly 
designated. But these requirements are certainly not met with the concept of 
the least restrictive alternative. To the contrary, the term is generally used so 
loosely that it reminds me of what Humpty-Dumpty said in Through the 
Looking Glass (Carroll 1969). He said, "When 1 use a word it means just what 1 
choose it to mean—neither more nor less." 
When we try to analyze the concept of the least restrictive alternative, we 
confront the fact that "to restrict" can mean more than one thing. It can either 
mean to limit, to confine, or to restrain. These three meanings, although they're 
somewhat related, actually deal respectively with different aspects of patient 
or client care. They deal with the personal autonomy, the social isolation, and the 
civil rights of mentally disabled people—so that when we seek to limit the 
restrictiveness of somebody's environment, we may be referring either to the 
person's personal autonomy, to his or her social isolation, or to his or her civil 
rights, or maybe to some vague combination of all these qualities. 
What we usually do, in effect, then, when we use the concept of the least 
restrictive alternative is ignore the fact that restrictiveness is mu tifaceted. We 
act instead as if it has a unitary meaning. We oversimplify it, so that it has 
only one referent—a geographical referent that's based on where a person 
lives. 
But let me put some questions to you. Is it nonrestrictive to let a patient or 
client live on the streets where he or she can be robbed, beaten, or raped? 
Where he or she doesn't even get the rudiments of subsistence? Where he or 
she can die of exposure or starvation? Is it nonrestrictive to place a patient or a 
client in a noninstitutional setting, even when he or she has expressed a 
contrary wish: to be inside an institution? Or when he or she lacks the 
competence to make that kind of a judgment? 
What I'm suggesting to you, of course, is that it's perfectly possible for us 
to reduce restrictiveness in the sense of social isolation—to remove a patient 
or a client from an institutional setting—at the same time that we increase his 
or her restrictiveness in the sense of personal autonomy or civil rights. We 
may put a person into the community—but at the same time expose him or 
her to an increased risk of psychological stress or personal danger. 
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Obviously, the notion of the least restrictive alternative, as we generally 
use it, is missing something important. And that important something is the 
consideration of individual need. 
I'm going to be coming back to the notion of the least restrictive alternative 
in just a little while. But the point I want to make right now is that it's the total 
lack of understanding of the ways in which we use words—and of the power 
that's implicit in those words—that make the semantics of services for the 
mentally disabled so very fascinating—and potentially so very insidious. 
Even when our intentions are honorable and humane, language can 
sometimes play powerful tricks on us. Even when our intent is to provide 
more humane care for the mentally disabled, that intent can be subverted by 
our lack of specificity. 
YOUNG ADULT CHRONIC PATIENTS 
Of course, not all semantic games are necessarily destructive. From time to 
time, we engage in a semantic game that actually enhances our ability to 
serve the mentally disabled. In the field of mental health, for example, we're 
currently playing a very involved semantic game called "young adult chronic 
patients." 1 call this an involved game—a very complicated game—because it 
has both some positive and negative aspects. 
What we've done is isolate a group of patients and made the judgment that 
the service system holds insuperable barriers for them. And we've identified 
this group of patients largely on the basis of their age—18 to 35 years (Pepper 
& Ryglewicz 1984). By focusing our attention on these young patients, we've 
been able to sort out some very serious deficits in our service system. This, in 
turn, enables us to think about revamping our services in an entirely new 
way (Bachrach 1984b). 
But on closer examination we find that it's not their age as such that 
differentiates these young adults from other chronically mentally ill people. 
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The thing that makes them different is their collective and unprecedented 
impact on an unyielding service system (Bachrach 1984b). So, although the 
youth of these patients has become a focal point of our concern, that's not the 
basis for their service deficits. What is important is the fact that they, as the 
first generation of patients to seek care in an essentially deinstitutionalized 
service system, are misfits within that system. The available interventions are 
not congruent with their special needs. Once again, I would point to aftercare 
services as an example of programming that's more appropriate for a former 
generation of chronic mental patients. 
As a concept, the young adult chronic patient has both positive and 
negative aspects. On the positive side, the concept serves as an ideal 
construct for us—a construct that enables us to appreciate some of the deficits 
of the mental health service system better than we did before the concept was 
introduced. 
But what's the negative part? Well, the fact is that the concept of the young 
adult chronic patient is being used loosely and is becoming cast in concrete in 
a very unrealistic way (Bachrach 1984b). To be more specific, the baby boom 
generation, which was born between 1946 and 1961, provides the de-
nominator for the young adult chronic patient population as it was originally 
described in the hterature a few years ago (Pepper et al. 1981). But this 
population has now begun to age, and it's currently between the ages of 23 
and 38. What's more, a simple look at the nation's demography shows us that 
we'll soon have a bulge of middle-aged chronic mental patients—and then, 
not too much later, a bulge of geriatric chronic patients. 
Are we going to be ready for them? Or are we still going to be perseverating 
with the need to serve young adults from 18 to 35 as the most problematic 
target population? I get the distinct impression from at least some of the 
people who use the concept of the young adult chronic patient that they're so 
tuned in to its positive va ue, that they're simply not seeing the other side— 
the risks that are attached to this concept. 
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DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION 
I wanted to mention the concept of the young adult chronic patient at this 
time, because it makes a very appropriate lead-in to another subject: 
deinstitutionalization. When we think about young adult chronic mental 
patients in today's system of care, we're inevitably concerning ourselves with 
the policy of deinstitutionalization—with its practices and its implications. 
In fact, as 1 think about services for the mentally disabled as they've 
developed in recent years, it's really hard for me to consider them in any 
context other than that of deinstitutionalization. Deinstitutionalization is, 1 
think without any doubt, the single major policy thrust that's determined the 
direction of mental health and mental retardation services for the past two or 
three decades. In fact, it's predominated to such an extent that it's very 
difficult for most of us to imagine serving the mentally disabled in anything 
other than service systems that are essentially deinstitutionalized in concept 
and direction—if not entirely deinstitutionalized in fact. 
Deinstitutionalization is also, I think, the most popular semantic game in 
mental health and mental retardation today. Everybody who plays it is in 
there to win. Listen to how some different people and documents describe 
and define deinstitutionalization: 
• An editorial in the New York Times defines deinstitutionalization simply 
as "moving mental patients from enormous, remote hospitals into small 
community residences" (Willowbrook Plan 1982)—a very simple statement of 
a changed locus of care. 
• Richard Scheerenberger (1977), the Director of a state facility for the 
mentally retarded in Wisconsin, calls deinstitutionalization "one of the most 
significant concepts affecting contemporary programs for mentally retarded 
persons." And he notes that its outcomes have been both positive and 
negative. 
• The sociologist and public policy analyst Amitai Etzioni (1976) refers to 
deinstitutionalization as a "policy fashion" that, by condemning traditional 
care for the mentally disabled, "romanticizes the benefits of community-
based care." 
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• The current President of the American Psychiatric Association, John 
Talbott (1979), says that deinstitutionalization is a misnomer that should be 
replaced by the term "transinstitutionalization" to indicate that "the chroni-
cally mentally ill patient [has] had his locus of living and care transferred from 
a single lousy institution to multiple wretched ones." 
• The psychiatrist Mathew Dumont (1982) writes even more pointedly. He 
says: "Let us stop the cant and quibbling. This thing, 'deinstitutionalization,' 
is nothing more or less than a polite term for the cutting of mental health 
budgets." 
• Edward Koch, the Mayor of the city of New York, tells us that 
deinstitutionalization is a "fancy word" that describes "dereliction of duty" 
on the part of the state of New York toward its mentally disabled citizens 
(Sullivan 1983a). Meanwhile, the state of New York argues back with a 
different understanding of the term and asserts that the policy of dein-
stitutionalization—in the sense of releasing patients from state hospitals-
has now been discontinued (Sullivan 1983b). 
• Shari Thurer (1983), a rehabilitation counselor in Boston, points out that 
deinstitutionalization is a women's issue, because, ultimately, the burden of 
community-based care falls upon family members, and most particularly 
upon the women in those fami ies—a view that is, incidentally, borne out by 
research findings (Froland 1982; Hatfield 1978; Hatfield et al. 1982; Holden & 
Lewine 1982; Spaniol & Jung 1983). 
• Most often, the word deinstitutionalization refers to people—that is, we 
speak of deinstitutionalized patients or clients. But sometimes the word is 
a so used to refer to service systems, or even to specific services—so that a 
newspaper article describes a nursing home as being "painstakingly dein-
stitutionalized to provide a gracious personal atmosphere for its aged guests" 
(Goldsmith 1981). 
Maybe some of our problems with the term deinstitutionalization can be 
traced back to the fact that the word "institution" itself has a variety of 
meanings (Jones & Fowles 1984). But, for whatever reason, deinstitutionaliza-
tion has proceeded in the absence of a consensual understanding of its 
meanings, its referents, and its purposes. 
So—what do we redly mean by that very busy word, deinstitutionaliza-
tion? I've never found out its precise origins, even though I've been 
preoccupied with its consequences for a good many years now, and 1 can tell 
you that I've been criticized more than once for the fact that I've made 
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deinstitutionalization my major research focus and area of study. The fact is 
that a lot of people simply object to my using this word. They see it as 
imprecise, or inaccurate, or confusing—and, of course, they're perfectly 
right. 
1 was interested to read recently that there's a sound-alike in the field of 
economics: "deindustrialization." It's a term that's apparently used to refer to 
the effects of foreign trade policy on American industry. This is what the 
renowned economist, Robert Samuelson (1984), has to say about deindus-
trialization: that it's "one of those mongrel words that has crept into the 
language and ought to be kicked out. The purpose of language is to inform; 
this word misinforms," says Samuelson. 
Sound familiar? 
But you have to recognize that even people's reservations about the word 
deinstitutionalization haven't stopped them from using it—and using it 
widely—either as a rallying cry or as a planning concept. What's really 
strange about this is that when people do use the word, they're likely to act as 
if everyone else uses it just as they do! And they seem to be blissfully 
unaware of the confusion thaf multiple definitions have wrought. 
Nevertheless, there is a core of agreement. 1 think that many people would 
be ready to agree that deinstitutionalization refers, generally, to our recent 
efforts to reverse the trend of providing treatment or care for mentally 
disabled people in custodial and physically isolated environments. It's closely 
related to notions like "normalization" (Wolfensberger 1970) and "main-
streaming" (Silverman 1979)—whatever those are. But this is only a 
superficial kind of a definition. It doesn't really tell us a whole lot about the 
dynamics of deinstitutionalization. 
In fact, one of the first things that happens when you become a serious 
student of deinstitutionalization is that you notice that people usually just 
don't bother to define the word. They certainly don't often bother to state its 
limits. I don't think that that's altogether accidental. As a vague and poorly 
defined term, deinstitutionalization allows us to ignore some of the things 
that we couldn't get away with avoiding, if we were a little bit more precise. 
Again, 1 think that we do a lot of this unconsciously. But 1 do think that the 
term deinstitutionalization serves to provide legitimation for some very 
complex—and sometimes controversial—planning decisions. 
So, if we don't define the word deinstitutionalization too carefully—if we 
don't bother to state its limits—then maybe we can avoid dealing with some 
of its implications. 
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Fact, Process, and Philosophy 
For a number of years now I've used a two-part definition of dein-
stitutionalization in my work. I've defined it as the shunning, or avoidance, 
of traditional institutional settings, particularly state hospitals and state 
schools, for the care of mentally disabled people and the concurrent 
development and expansion of community-based facilities for the care of this 
population (Bachrach 1976). In 1978 1 expanded that definition by analyzing 
the term conceptually. In an article in Hospital and Community Psychiatry that 
year, 1 suggested that there are at least three distinct—though closely 
related—aspects of deinstitutionalization. Deinstitutionalization is a fact. It's 
also a process. And it's also a philosophy. 
Now, what exactly did I mean when I wrote that? 1 meant, basically, that 
deinstitutionalization is a very complicated term that we need to treat with 
respect—and that by oversimplifying the concept, we've brought grief to our 
patients and clients and brought confusion to ourselves. 1 cautioned then that 
oversimplification would only cause us to lose sight of what deinstitutionali-
zation is really all about. 
As a fact, deinstitutionalization can be thought of as an objective series of 
events—events that are manifested in a massive shift in the locus of care for 
the mentally disabled. If you take a look at utilization statistics in this 
country, you'll see that inpatient care—and, more specifically, institutional 
inpatient care—for the mentally disabled has vastly decreased as a propor-
tion of all care—at the same time that outpatient care has increased in a most 
dramatic way (Goldman et al. 1983; Hill & Lakin 1984; Thompson et al. 1982). 
It's this shift in patient and client care settings that gives substance to 
deinstitutionalization as a fact. 
And deinstitutionalization as a fact is exactly where many understandings 
of the term begin—and end. But, in addition to its being a fact, deinstitution-
alization is also very much a process. Specifically, deinstitutionalization is a 
process of social change—of movement away from one orientation in patient 
and client care to another orientation that's radically different. This process, 
which has been going on for two or three decades in most parts of the 
country, has all by itself affected the lives of the mentally disabled. 
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In other words—and I can't stress this too strongly—the very process of 
change has created its own momentum. Deinstitutionalization, as a process, 
involves all the elements of the service system. It's a dynamic and ongoing 
series of accommodations and shifting boundaries. And, not surprisingly, it's 
caused severe disequilibrium in the service system—disequilibrium that's 
cunently reflected in a number of serious problems. These problems have 
been my major preoccupation for quite a few years. 
So, deinstitutionalization isn't only a fact; it's also a process—a process that 
has had some consequences of its own. And if we look at it simply as 
numbers of people moving from one place to another, we can easily lose sight 
of the process. 
But deinstitutionalization is something else as well. It's a philosophy—a 
philosophy that has its roots in post-World War 11 America, when a variety of 
civil rights protests were gaining widespread support. Like other civil rights 
protests in that post-war era, deinstitutionalization emphasized the inalien-
able rights of disfranchised individuals—in this case, the mentally disabled— 
and their legitimate claims on society. The deinstitutionalization movement 
undertook no less impressive a task than one of "humanizing" care for the 
mentally disabled—of reversing the dehumanizing influences that were 
widely thought to be the inevitable accompaniments of institutional resi-
dence. 
Now, to say that deinstitutionalization was ideologically part of the civil 
rights movement is not the same thing as saying that it lacked commitment 
from other ideological constituencies. As a matter of fact, deinstitutionaliza-
tion also held great appeal for fiscal reformers in addition to social reformers. 
In addition to the belief that community-based care is more humane than 
institutional care, there was a second belief: that community-based care is 
also less expensive (Cramer 1978; von Hoffman 1980). Usually, social 
reformers and fiscal reformers don't have a whole lot to say to one another, 
but in this case they did. And this coalition—this rare marriage of two 
ordinarily antagonistic constituencies—gave the deinstitutionalization move-
ment unprecedented impetus. 
So that's what it was all about. Community-based care was supposed to be 
both better and cheaper than institutional care. And the fact that these 
assumptions were never really tested—that they were really matters of faith. 
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not science—didn't make a bit of difference. It's a fairly common observation 
in the field of semantics that assumptions don't need to be tested in order to 
be used as justifications. They only need to be believed (Edelman 1977; 
Hayakawa 1972). In fact, maybe it's better if they're not tested! 
There were a few other assumptions that became part and parcel of the 
ideology of deinstitutionalization, too. For example, it was widely assumed 
that members of the community and community organizations would rally— 
and that they would take the initiative in caring for the mentally disabled. 
And it was also assumed that, somehow, with a changed locus of care, the 
stigma that's associated with mental disability would disappear. These 
assumptions weren't tested either, but they certainly were believed. 
But 1 think that from the point of view of service planning, the most 
important of the untested assumptions in deinstitutionalization was the 
thought that communities could and would provide alternatives for the full 
range of services and functions that are associated with institutional care 
(Bachrach 1976, 1983a; Shepherd 1982). It was assumed that the community 
could and would provide long-term treatment and residence for the most 
disabled among our mentally ill and mentally retarded citizens. And it was 
assumed that the community could and would assert itself to assure that 
patients and clients would be adequately monitored over long periods of 
time. 
Still more: It was assumed that the community could and would render 
relief to the patient's or client's family and that it would create and reinforce 
social networks for the disabled person. And that it would serve as an 
advocate for the patient or client, when he or she was having trouble in 
gaining access to goods or services. 
You'll recognize, of course, that all of these functions are part of the 
institutional sociology: part of the concept of total care that goes with 
institutionalization. And we just assumed very early in deinstitutionaliza-
tion—either explicitly or implicitly—that these functions could readily and 
easily be picked up by the community. 
What a number we did on ourselves! 
What I'm saying to you, then, is that if you have an ideology that's strong 
enough to motivate you to action, and you use words and concepts that are 
vague enough so that the ideology isn't put to a proper test—then you have 
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the makings of rapid, precipitate, and sometimes manifestly harmful social 
change. And that's what deinstitutionalization, in most of the country, was 
really all about! 
To this day, many of these assumptions continue to be accepted on faith, 
even when we have evidence that they lack validity both in scientific and 
human terms. Community tenure—that is, the patient's or client's length of 
stay in the community—is pretty much accepted today as an indicator of 
good and appropriate care (Adler et al. 1984). In fact, it's accepted to such an 
extent, that it's the most widely used outcome measure in our field (Bachrach 
1982). 
But, if you think about it, simple measures of community tenure don't tell 
us anything about how a patient or client is doing or feeling and whether the 
quality of his or her life has improved or deteriorated. The Canadian 
psychiatrist Vivian Rakoff (1976) is fully justified in warning us that we must 
not let our statistics persuade us that "we have performed a social miracle 
and there are no more mad men [or women, 1 would interpolate] in the 
world." 
COMMUNITY AND ASYLUM 
Up to this point, I've been trying to accomplish essentially two major 
things. First, I've been trying to build up a logical structure for understanding 
some current problems that we have in serving mentally disabled people. 
And second, I've been trying to demonstrate how conceptualizations and 
semantic constructs that have been part of the deinstitutionalization move-
ment from the very beginning have placed us in jeopardy. And we owe much 
of this to the fact that deinstitutionalization is a series of events that 
encompass fact, philosophy, and a process of social change. What's more, 
there's a serious disjunction between the fact, the process, and the philoso-
phy of deinstitutionalization. 
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And that's not all. The concept of deinstitutionalizatlQn has had good 
company. It's been supported in its inadequacy as a planning concept by a 
host of other similarly vague notions. 
Let's look at the word "community" very briefly. Deinstitutionalization is a 
neologism—a fabricated word that you don't find in the dictionary. But a 
word doesn't need to be a neologism in order for it to be inadequate for 
rlanning purposes. Even a good old word like community can be similarly 
imited. Community has many, many definitions—and, by some of them, a 
state hospital or a state school would itself qualify as a community! 
1 can't resist digressing and saying just a word or two more about 
community. We play a very good semantic game with community. We use it 
in conjunction with many other buzzwords—like "catchmenting," "support 
system," and "involvement"—to justify our program initiatives. 
Now, a number of authors have written some very learned analytical 
articles that deal with what community means—with its multiple definitions 
and its subtle implications (Back 1970; Huffine & Craig 1973; Kantar 1981; 
Larson 1977; Luloff & Greenwood 1980; Panzetta 1971; Regester 1974). But we 
in mental health and mental retardation do all those worthy scholars one 
better: we already KNOW what community is. It's any place that isn't an 
institution! 
Is it any wonder that we've had problems with "community" in service 
planning and service delivery? 
One particular semantic transmutation that's done a lot to confound issues 
in the care of the mentally disabled is our confusion with the concept of 
"asylum." If we've glorified the concept of the least restrictive alternative, 
then we've done just the opposite with the concept of asylum. We've made a 
villain of the term—at least when we apply it to the mentally disabled. (You'll 
notice, of course, that we use a different standard when we apply asylum to 
political refugees. And we're also very involved at this time in many parts of 
the country with the hospice movement (Teltsch 1980)—which can really be 
construed as a form of asylum. But, somehow, we think of asylum for the 
mentally disabled in a different way.) 
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I think our reaction to the word asylum can be largely attributed to the fact 
that the word means more than one thing. The dictionary defines asylum as 
"an inviolable refuge; a sanctuary; a place where one is safe and secure." But 
the dictionary also gives as a second definition of asylum "the protection 
given by a sanctuary or a refuge." 
So the word asylum really has two meanings—first, as a place; and, 
second, as an event. Asylum—that is, safe haven, is something that may be 
provided in an asylum—that is, a place where protection is offered. 1 think 
that this dual meaning of the word asylum has really gotten us into a lot of 
trouble. 
Let's take a closer look at this situation: 
It's fairly widely held in planning circles today that asylums are intrinsically 
undesirable places that breed their own pathology (Goffman 1961) and that 
they should be supplanted by community-based service sites. Of course, this 
notion has a lot of historical support. 1 don't think that any of us would want 
to have to defend the abuses that took place in institutions that we called 
asylums in past years. And 1 think that most of us today are very wary lest 
those same abuses somehow be reintroduced, even though there's some 
pretty strong evidence now that long-term care facilities actually provide the 
settings of choice for some—not all, but some—mentally disabled people 
(Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry 1982; Peele 1983; Peele et al. 1977). 
In any case, though, when we've tried to do something about the 
pathological aspects of places called asylums, we've become confused by our 
own rhetoric. We've overlooked the very basic consideration that institu-
tional care involves more than just a residential setting. As 1 pointed out 
earlier, institutional care also covers a suprisingly complex set of functions in 
the service of the mentally disabled. And one of those functions—a critical 
one—is providing access to safety and security for those patients and clients 
who have such a need. 
Obviously, this has been a classic kind of baby-and-bath-water situation. 
And, needless to say, it's sometimes had devastating consequences for 
patients and clients. To put it simply, there's often no place in today's service 
system where people who need asylum can go—where they'll be psychologi-
cally, not to mention physically, safe and secure (Bachrach 1984a; Sheehan 
1982). 
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Now, I feel that it's important for me to issue a disclaimer at this point. 
Very often, when 1 say the kinds of things I've just been saying, people seem 
to hear me say something else. They seem somehow to be the victims of their 
own semantic games. So they sometimes hear me proposing a return to the 
era of institutional care. Not only am 1 not saying that; 1 don't even think it's 
feasible. Institutions themselves are serving more and more as acute care 
facilities, and the old time institutions seem to be slipping away (Goldman et 
al. 1983). 
So, please don't construe what I'm saying to you as either an acceptance of 
the quality of care that used to prevail in places we called asylums or as a call 
for us to return to the "good old days." I'm most emphatically not supporting 
either thing. All I'm suggesting to you is that the concept of total care for 
some mentally disabled people (Freeman 1983)—a kind of total care that 
includes asylum care—is a valid and appropriate concept. Not for all patients 
and clients, but for some. And that, in getting rid of places called asylums, 
we've too often forgotten that this kind of care is critically needed by some of 
the people we're trying to serve. 
Some people have a temporary or episodic need for asylum. And other 
people seem to have a continuous and never-abating need. But for a portion 
of the population of mentally disabled individuals, we can't ignore the need 
for asy um—at least if we mean to provide for these people in a relevant and 
humane way. 
And I'm saying one more thing, too. I'm saying that, to me, at least, the 
"where" of asylum is a lot less important than the "what." We now know 
that it's potentially possible to provide asylum in either institutional or non-
institutional settings (Lamb 1979). If we don't want to do it in one place, then 
we simply have to do it in another. But we can't abandon it altogether. 
And we simply must not repeat the terrible error we've made over and over 
again in deinstitutionalization—the error of removing institutional care 
before we've provided viable alternatives in the community, the error of 
eliminating asylum care as we've eliminated places called asylums. 
Deinstitutionalization, if it's going to be done right, isn't all glamor. It isn't 
all patients improving, chronicity going away, and communities reaching out 
to assist the mentally disabled. It's sometimes those things, of course. But 
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sometimes it's less appealing things, too—like providing care in the 
community to people that we used to lock away because we didn't want to 
see them and even going to bat for them when other people don't want to 
have them around. It's seeing to it that these people are fed and clothed and 
given medical care, even when their paranoia about us causes them to avoid 
us and wander homeless on the streets. Most basically, it's providing them 
with shelter and a place where they can be physically safe while we try to 
figure out ways to treat their illnesses, mitigate their disabilities, and quiet 
their special demons. 
This brings us full circle to the notion of the least restrictive alternative. 
If you think about it, that concept provides what's basically an environ-
mental, not an individual, response to questions about service planning for 
the mentally disabled. It emphasizes the qualities and characteristics of places 
—state hospitals or state schools, or nursing homes, or halfway houses, or 
board and care homes—instead of the qualities and characteristics of patients 
or clients. It says, in effect, that a particular place is intrinsically superior to 
some other place for people who are mentally disabled. 
When placements are made according to this kind of judgment, it becomes 
all too easy to lose sight of the fact that some patients or clients need asylum 
quite independently of where it's provided and that that need supersedes 
geography. Similarly, other patients or clients need other kinds of services-
medical, psychiatric, social, or rehabilitative services—again, quite indepen-
dently of the geography of the situation. 
This is why Joel Klein (1981), an attorney for fhe American Psychiatric 
Association, claims that the concept of the least restrictive alternative is 
"fundamentally flawed." He summarizes some of its basic logical hmitations 
with these very eloquent words: "Treatment and liberty cannot be viewed as 
independent variables, thereby suggesting that one—treatment—can be kept 
constant, while the other—liberty—is titrated along a continuum of restric-
tiveness. The provision of treatment is ultimately a clinical matter." 
1 
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IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Where does all of this leave us? 
I've been speaking about some extensive problems that are associated with 
serving mentally disabled people—problems that are closely associated with 
the ways in which we use language: the semantic games that we play. Are 
there any solutions to these problems? Can we possibly reverse our 
propensity for imprecision and fuzzy thinking? Or are we doomed to having 
a service system that's built on triteness at best and on dangerously vague 
concepts at worst? 
Well, 1 suppose I'm a Pollyanna—and I guess that in this business you 
have to be. And so I would say to you that we can do something about these 
problems. But only under certain circumstances. And certainly not overnight. 
And in no case is the process likely to be an easy one. 
I would suggest to you that we need to take a couple of steps in order to 
begin to turn things around. 
First, I think we need to renew our sense of commitment to the mentally 
disabled in these very hard times. 1 think it's easy for us to get demoralized 
and discouraged by the enormity of our problems and by the confusion we've 
had in the past. It's particularly easy to do this when there seems to be such 
gross insensitivity on the part of people and agencies who have the power to 
help. 
But we can't let our past enors discourage us. Instead, we need to go all out 
to let those errors teach us. We certainly have a lot to learn. But we also have 
a lot to learn from. 
Second, 1 think we need to work hard to educate ourselves to understand 
the power of words, as Giamatti described it—so that we can control them 
instead of letting them control us. We need to know why we play semantic 
games and what purposes they serve. 
I'd like to expand on this second point just a little bit before 1 bring this talk 
to a conclusion. 
1 think we all know that every time we plan services based on fuzzy 
thinking and imprecise concepts, we increase our already considerable 
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potential for confusing, confounding, and obstructing care for the mentally 
disabled. So why do we continue on this path? Why don't we just pull 
ourselves together and clean up our semantic act? 
Well, I think that the answer to this question takes us back to the nature of 
semantic games—to their subtlety and their basic purpose. 1 believe, very 
simply, that it's in the nature of these games to allow us to deceive ourselves. 
The point is often made that language has social uses that extend beyond 
denotation and description (Edelman 1977; Hayakawa 1972). Words reflect 
our ideology, our beliefs, and our social status. And, as 1 indicated at the 
beginning of this talk, words have the power to determine the questions that 
we ask—and, coincidentally, the questions that we never ask. 
Even imprecision in language can serve important functions, though 
they're not necessarily conscious. For example, imprecision lets us read into 
any word or concept whatever definition fits our own experiences or 
purposes. In this way, imprecision can eliminate our need to ask whether 
there are alternative perspectives or points of view. 
In addition to enabling us to maintain our beliefs, imprecision can also 
serve the further purpose of covering up inaction. When things sound busy, it 
becomes easy for us to persuade ourselves that they are busy. Slogans and 
other bandwagon words, irrespective of how well they reflect reality, are 
capable of deflecting critical thought. 
So, if we can rant about deinstitutionalizing people to less restrictive 
alternatives and even go to court to support the morality and legality of such 
measures, then maybe we won't have to confront the really hard things—like 
implementing appropriate standards of care in our treatment facilities or 
engaging reluctant service providers in our efforts. We leave those matters to 
take care of themselves, while we look the other way. 
In addition to helping us maintain our beliefs and assisting us in covering 
up inaction, imprecision can also serve to preserve the status quo. It's difficult 
for society—even that part of society that we think of as the mental health 
and mental retardation system—to accept changes that occur too rapidly. 
Imprecision helps us to keep the rate of change within the limits of cultural 
tolerance. It slows us down. 
Now, it's not surprising that, when you're starting something new— 
especially something so revolutionary that it turns around the entire 
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entrenched system of care for the mentally disabled—that you're going to be 
more than just a little bit tentative. At some level, you're aware that there are 
competing goals to which you need to assign priorities and competing 
populations that you need to serve. At some level, you know that there's a 
potential for unintended, but nonetheless serious, consequences issuing 
from your new interventions. And you know that some of your ideas will 
probably be costly—both in dollar terms and in terms of public approval. 
I see our semantic games as an acknowledgment of these kinds of things 
and even, in some ways, as an effort to ease the transition from an old to a 
new system of care: a necessary step, if you will . The problem isn't that we've 
played these games: some of them have been inevitable. The problem is that 
we won't give them up—that we're so enamored of them, that we hang on to 
them for dear life. 
To say all of this just a little bit differently, 1 think that, for a variety of 
reasons, we've needed to deceive ourselves in the past. The sociologist in me 
inclines me to believe that culture traits don't just occur by chance; they 
generally serve some purpose. And this is true for words, as well as for other 
items of culture. It's true for our vague concepts and our faulty logic. 
But things are different now. The need to deceive ourselves is over, and we 
have a very different kind of need now—a need for precision, for clearly 
stated goals, and for carefully worded objectives—so that we can plan our 
services for the mentally disabled rationally and evaluate their effects 
realistically and accurately. It's really incumbent upon us now to move 
ahead—to take control of our language, our concepts, and our logic. 
1 believe that we've come a long way in improving care for the mentally 
disabled over the past couple of decades. Today we can identify some of the 
sources of our problems in providing effective MHMR care. We can take a 
look at where our vagueness and imprecision have led us. That puts us 
potentially a giant step ahead of where we were 30 years ago, when we didn't 
even anticipate that there were going to be these kinds of problems. 
Now we need to sharpen up our thinking apparatus. We need to revise our 
concepts and revamp our logic, so that we can start to take appropriate action 
in response to the problems that we're now beginning to understand. 
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